PAKISTAN encapsulates some of the key security challenges facing the international community. The presence of al-Qaeda and nuclear weapons on its soil under the overhang of conflict-prone ties with India remain critical geo-political concerns.

Although media coverage related to Pakistan has emphasised the militancy issue in light of the violence in Pakistan and the conflict in Afghanistan, analysing the full dimensions of Pakistan’s nuclear programme is essential to understanding its security profile. Pakistan’s nuclear engagement began in 1955 as part of the Atoms for Peace programme launched by the US. Thirty-seven Pakistani scientists trained at US atomic facilities and a small research facility was established in Pakistan with US assistance.

Yet following Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war with India, its nuclear ambitions were weaponised.

In 1972, President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto declared, “if India builds the Bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even go hungry. But we will get one of our own.”

Two decades later in May 1998, in a series of tit-for-tat nuclear tests, India and Pakistan officially joined the nuclear club. Estimates suggest Pakistan has enough material for sixty to hundred bombs deliverable by attack aircraft and missiles.

To ensure proper command and control over this arsenal, in February 2002, the National Command Authority (NCA) was set up to formulate policy and exercise employment and development control over all strategic nuclear forces and organisations.

Under a presidential ordinance passed by Gen Musharraf in 2007, the president was to chair the NCA that was to include the prime minister as vice-chairman and senior cabinet and military officials. Last November, President Zardari handed his powers in the NCA to the prime minister though real control remains with the military.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is geared toward ensuring a “credible minimum deterrent” against India. As a result of India’s conventional military superiority, Pakistan has refrained from adopting a no-first-use doctrine, ie it retains the right to use nuclear weapons in a conflict even if it has not been attacked with them.  Pakistan has not articulated a formal nuclear doctrine; however, in January 2002, Gen Khalid Kidwai who chairs the NCA’s secretariat outlined general conditions of use: if India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory; destroys a large part either of its land or air forces; proceeds to the economic strangling of Pakistan; or pushes Pakistan into political destabilisation or creates a large scale internal subversion.

Four key concerns surround Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The first is a conflict with India escalating up the nuclear chain. To reduce such nuclear dangers, Pakistan and India have agreed to select nuclear confidence building measures including the annual exchange of a list of nuclear facilities that are not to be attacked during a war. Nonetheless, the risk of a war going nuclear remains. 

A second concern relates to nuclear proliferation. In 2003, reports surfaced that an international proliferation network headed by Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr A. Q. Khan provided nuclear technology, materials, and designs to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Whether the military was aware or ignorant, either scenario raises grave concerns. Since the network’s dismantling, however, there has been little evidence of further proliferation.

A third relates to the security of Pakistan’s stockpile in three ways: an “insider-outsider” threat whereby members of the nuclear establishment sympathetic to extremist causes may transfer nuclear technology to militant groups; a security breakdown during the rapid expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme; and an assault and takeover of a nuclear device or facility. In addition to local security measures, the US has assisted in enhancing security including through training by its national laboratories.

A final concern relates to fears within the Pakistani public and military that the US seeks to seize its nuclear weapons. 

Although concerns about nuclear security in Pakistan are often exaggerated, they cannot be dismissed. The consequence of a nuclear act in South Asia would have unthinkable consequences that cannot be masked by the clinical language of “doctrine”, “deterrence” and “command and control”.